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Abstract
In this paper sharing the cost of emission in supply chains are con-
sidered. We focus on allocation problems that can be described by
rooted trees, called cost-tree problems, and on the induced transfer-
able utility cooperative games, called upstream responsibility games
(Gopalakrishnan et al., 2017). The formal notion of upstream respon-
sibility games is introduced, and the characterization of the class of
these games is provided.
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is probably the most popular
value for transferable utility cooperative games. Dubey (1982) and
Moulin and Shenker (1992) show respectively, that Shapley (1953)’s
and Young (1985)’s axiomatizations of the Shapley value are valid on
the class of airport games.
We extend Dubey’s and Moulin and Shenker’s results onto the
class of upstream responsibility games, that is, we provide two char-
acterizations of the Shapley value for upstream responsibility games.
Keywords: Upstream responsibility games; Cost sharing; Emis-
sion; Supply chain; Shapley value; Rooted tree; Axiomatization of the
Shapley value.
JEL Classification: C71.
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider cost sharing problems given by rooted trees, called
cost-tree problems. We assign transferable utility (TU) cooperative games
(henceforth games) to these cost sharing problems. Specializing the problem,
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we consider energy supply chains with a motivated dominant leader, who
has the power to assign the suppliers responsibilities for both direct and
indirect emissions. The induced games are called upstream responsibility
games (Gopalakrishnan et al., 2017).
For an example consider a supply chain where we look at the responsibility
allocation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission among the firms in the chain.
One of the main questions is how to share the costs related to the emission
among the firms. The supply chain and the related firms (or any other actors)
can be represented by a rooted tree.
The root of the tree represents the end product produced by the supply
chain. The root is connected to only one node which is the leader of the
chain. Each further node represents one firm, and the edges of the rooted tree
represent the producing process among the firms with the related emissions.
Our goal is to share the responsibility of the emission while embodying the
principle of upstream emission responsibility.
In this paper we rely on the TU game model of Gopalakrishnan et al.
(2017), called GHG Responsibility-Emissions and Environment (GREEN)
game. Gopalakrishnan et al. use the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) as an al-
location method, consider some pollution related properties that an emission
allocation rule should meet, and provide several axiomatizations as well.
Airport problems and the associated airport games (Littlechild and Thomp-
son, 1977) are defined by chains, a special case of rooted trees. Thomson
(2007) gives an overview on the results for airport games. The two main ax-
iomatizations of the Shapley value, Shapley (1953)’s and Young (1985)’s ax-
iomatizations, are considered on airport games by Dubey (1982) and Moulin
and Shenker (1992) respectively.
An other extension of the airport games is the well-known class of (stan-
dard) fixed-tree games, which is an application of irrigation problems, consid-
ered by Aadland and Kolpin (1998) and Ma´rkus et al. (2011) among others.
It is well-known that the validity of a solution concept can vary from
subclass to subclass, e.g. Shapley (1953)’s axiomatization of the Shapley
value is valid on the class of monotone games but not valid on the class
of strictly monotone games. Therefore, we must consider each subclass of
games one by one.
In this paper, we consider upstream responsibility games and character-
ize this class of games. We show that the class of upstream responsibility
games is a non-convex cone which is a proper subset of the finite convex
cone spanned by the duals of the unanimity games, therefore every upstream
responsibility game is concave. Furthermore, as a corollary we show that
Shapley (1953)’s and Young (1985)’s axiomatizations work on the class of
upstream responsibility games. We also notice that the Shapley value is
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stable for upstream responsibility games, that is, it is always in the core
(Shapley, 1955). This result is a simple corollary of the Ichiishi-Shapley the-
orem (Shapley, 1971; Ichiishi, 1981) and that every upstream responsibility
game is concave. Also by our characterization of the class of upstream re-
sponsibility games we get that the Shapley value can be computed efficiently
on this class of games (this result is analogue to the one by Megiddo (1978)
for fixed-tree games).
The setup of this paper is as follows: in the next section we introduce the
concept of upstream responsibility games and characterize the class of them.
In Section 3 we present our characterization results: we show that Shapley
(1953)’s and Young (1985)’s axiomatizations of the Shapley value work on
the classes of upstream responsibility games.
2 Airport and Upstream Responsibility Games
2.1 Preliminaries
Notions, notations : #N is for the cardinality of set N , and 2N denotes the
class of all subsets of N . A ⊂ B means A ⊆ B, but A 6= B. A unionmulti B stands
for the union of disjoint sets A and B.
A graph is a pair G = (V,E), where the elements of V are called vertices
or nodes, and E stands for the ordered pairs of vertices, called edges or arcs.
A rooted tree is a graph in which any two vertices are connected by exactly
one simple path, and one vertex has been designated the root denoted as
node root. In the case of a supply chain consisting several entities, which are
cooperating in the production of a final product, the manufacturing process
can be modeled with a directed rooted tree. The set of nodes V represents the
entities, henceforth players, and a directed arc emanating from node i towards
root represents the activity by player i contributing to the manufacturing of
the final product. We assume that only one node emanates arc enters the
root, this emanates from node 1 which node represents the end consumer.
The tree-order is the partial ordering on the vertices of a rooted tree with
i ≤ j, if the unique path from j to the root passes through i. The chain is a
rooted tree such that any vertices i, j ∈ V , i ≤ j or j ≤ i. That is, a chain
is a rooted tree with only one ”branch”. For any pair e ∈ E, e = ij means
e is an edge between vertices i, j ∈ V such that i ≤ j. For each i ∈ V , let
Si(G) = {j ∈ V : j ≥ i}, that is, for any i ∈ V , i ∈ Si(G). For each i ∈ V
let Pi(G) = {j ∈ V : j ≤ i}, that is, for any i ∈ V , i ∈ Pi(G). Moreover,
for any V ′ ⊆ V , let (PV ′(G), EV ′) be the sub-rooted-tree of (V,E), where
PV ′(G) = ∪i∈V ′Pi(G) and EV ′ = {ij ∈ E : i, j ∈ PV ′(G)}.
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Let c : E → R+, c and (G, c) are called cost function and cost-tree
respectively. An interpretation of cost tree (G, c) might be as follows: there
is a given product which is produced by a supply chain. V = N ∪ {root}, N
denotes the set of all entities of the supply process. Node 1 denotes the end
consumer, and the leaf nodes represents the most upstream members (that is,
firms, etc.) of the supply chain. Each edge e ∈ E is associated with a process
in the supply chain emitting a pollution c(e). Let ei denote the unique edge
in the tree T emanating from node i (in the direction of the root). In this case
c(ei) represents the direct pollution associated with ei, the directly created
pollution by node (firm) i. Besides i also can be responsible for the pollution
of other processes in the chain. For each node i, Ei denotes the set of edges
whose associated pollution is the direct or indirect responsibility of node i.
Let N 6= ∅, #N <∞, and v : 2N → R be a function such that v(∅) = 0.
Then N , v are called set of players, and transferable utility cooperative game
(henceforth game) respectively. The class of games with player set N is
denoted by GN .
A game v ∈ GN is convex, if for all S, T ⊆ N , v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪
T ) + v(S ∩ T ), moreover, it is concave, if for all S, T ⊆ N , v(S) + v(T ) ≥
v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ).
The dual of game v ∈ GN is game v¯ ∈ GN such that for all S ⊆ N ,
v¯(S) = v(N)− v(N \ S). It is well known that the dual of a convex game is
a concave game and vice versa.
Let v ∈ GN and i ∈ N , and v′i(S) = v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S), where S ⊆ N .
The vector v′i is called player i’s marginal contribution function in game v.
Alternatively, v′i(S) is player i’s marginal contribution to coalition S in game
v.
Let v ∈ GN , the players i, j ∈ N are equivalent, i ∼v j, if for all S ⊆ N
such that i, j /∈ S, v′i(S) = v′j(S).
Let N and T ∈ 2N \ ∅, and for all S ⊆ N , let
uT (S) =
{
1, if T ⊆ S,
0 otherwise.
The game uT is called unanimity game on coalition T .
In this paper we use the duals of the unanimity games. For any T ∈ 2N \∅
and for all S ⊆ N ,
u¯T (S) =
{
1, if T ∩ S 6= ∅,
0 otherwise.
It is clear that every unanimity game is convex, and the duals of the
unanimity games are concave.
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Henceforth, we assume that in the considered cost-tree problems there
are at least two players, that is, #V ≥ 3 and #N ≥ 2.
Next we introduce the notion of upstream responsibility games (URG)
(Gopalakrishnan et al., 2017). Let (G, c) be a cost-tree, representing a supply
chain, and N be the set of the members of the chain, henceforth players (the
vertices but the root). We denote by aj the pollution associated with arc
j. Let c({i}) denote the total pollution emission that player i is directly or
indirectly responsible for. Ei represents the set of edges whose associated
pollution is the direct or indirect responsibility of player i, c({i}) = a(Ei) ≡∑
j∈Ei aj. For every S ⊆ N let ES denote the collection of edges whose
associated pollution is the direct or indirect responsibility of the players in
S, thus ES = ∪i∈SEi and the pollution which S is directly or indirectly
responsible for is c(S) = a(ES) ≡
∑
j∈ES aj.
The class of upstream responsibility games with player set N is denoted
by GNUR. Let GG denote the subclass of upstream responsibility games induced
by cost-tree problems on a (specific) rooted tree G.
Definition 1 (Upstream Responsibility Game). For any cost-tree (G, c), let
N = V \ {root} be the player set, and for any coalition S (the empty sum is
0) let the upstream responsibility game be defined as follows
v(G,c)(S) =
∑
j∈ES
aj .
The next example is an illustration of the above definition.
Example 2. Consider the cost-tree in Figure 1, where the rooted tree G =
(V,E) is as follows, V = {root, 1, 2, 3}, A = {root1, 12, 13}, and the cost
(pollution) function c is defined as c(root1) = 2, c(12) = 4 and c(13) = 1.
Figure 1: The cost-tree (G, c)
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The upstream responsibility game v(G,c) = (0, 7, 4, 1, 7, 7, 5, 7), that is,
v(G,c)(∅) = 0, v(G,c)({1}) = 7, v(G,c)({2}) = 4, v(G,c)({3}) = 1, v(G,c)({1, 2}) =
7, v(G,c)({1, 3}) = 7, v(G,c)({2, 3}) = 5 and v(G,c)(N) = 7.
The notion of airport games is introduced by Littlechild and Thompson
(1977). An airport problem can be illustrated by the following example.
There is an airport with one runway, and there are k types of planes. Each
type of planes i determines a cost ci for maintaining the runway. E.g. if i
stands for the small planes, then the maintenance cost of a runway for small
planes is ci. If j is the category of big planes, then ci < cj, since the big
planes need longer runway. That is, the player set N is given by a partition:
N = N1 unionmulti · · · unionmulti Nk, where Ni stands for the planes of category i, and each
category i determines a maintenance cost ci, such that c1 < . . . < ck. When
we consider a coalition of players (planes) S, then the maintenance cost of
coalition S is the maximum maintenance cost of the members’ maintenance
costs of S. That is, the cost of coalition S is the maintenance cost of the
biggest plane of coalition S.
We provide two equivalent definitions of airport games; the first one is as
follows:
Definition 3 (Definition of Airport Games I). Let N = N1 unionmulti · · · unionmultiNk be the
player set, and c ∈ Rk+, such that c1 < . . . < ck ∈ R+ be an airport problem.
Then airport game v(N,c) ∈ GN is defined as follows, v(N,c)(∅) = 0, and for
each non-empty coalition S ⊆ N
v(N,c)(S) = max
i:Ni∩S 6=∅
ci .
An alternative definition of airport games is as follows:
Definition 4 (Definition of Airport Games II). Let N = N1unionmulti· · ·unionmultiNk be the
player set, and c = c1 < . . . < ck ∈ R+ be an airport problem. Let G = (V,E)
be a chain such that V = N ∪ {root} and E = {root1, 12, . . . ,#N − 1#N},
where N1 = {1, . . . ,#N1}, . . . , Nk = {#N −#Nk + 1, . . . ,#N}. Moreover,
for each ij ∈ E, let c(ij) = cN(j)−cN(i), where N(i) = {N∗ ∈ {N1, · · · , Nk} :
i ∈ N∗}.
For cost-tree (G, c) airport game v(N,c) ∈ GN is defined as follows: let
N = V \ {root} be the player set, and for any coalition S (the empty sum is
0)
v(N,c)(S) =
∑
e∈ES
c(e) .
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It is obvious that both definitions above give the same games, and let the
class of airport games with player set N be denoted by GNA . Furthermore,
let GG denote the subclass of airport games induced by airport problems
on chain G. Notice that, the notation GG is consistent with the notation
introduced in Definition 1, because if G is a chain, then GG ⊆ GA, in other
cases, when G is not a chain, GG \ GA 6= ∅. Since not every rooted tree is a
chain, GNA ⊂ GNUR.
Example 5. Consider the airport problem (N, c′), where N = {{1} unionmulti {2, 3}},
and c′N(1) = 5 and c
′
N(2) = c
′
N(3) = 8 (N(2) = N(3)). Then consider
the cost-tree in Figure 2, where the rooted tree G = (V,A) is as follows,
V = {root, 1, 2, 3}, A = {root1, 12, 23}, and the cost function c is defined as
c(root1) = 5, c(12) = 3 and c(23) = 0.
Figure 2: The cost-tree (G, c)
Then the induced airport game is as follows: v(G,c) = (0, 5, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8),
that is v(G,c)(∅) = 0, v(G,c)({1}) = 5, v(G,c)({2}) = v(G,c)({3}) = v(G,c)({1, 2})
= v(G,c)({1, 3}) = v(G,c)({2, 3}) = v(G,c)(N) = 8.
Next we characterize the classes of airport games and upstream respon-
sibility games. First, we take an obvious observation, for any rooted tree G,
GG is a cone, that is for any α ≥ 0, αGG ⊆ GG. Since union of cones is also
a cone, both GNA and GNUR are cones.
Lemma 6. For any rooted tree G, GG is a cone, therefore, GNA and GNUR are
cones.
In the following lemma we show that the dual of any unanimity game is
an airport game.
Lemma 7. For any chain G, T ⊆ N such that T = Pi(G), i ∈ N , u¯T ∈ GG.
Therefore, {u¯T}T∈2N\{∅} ⊂ GNA ⊂ GNUR.
Proof. For any i ∈ N , N = (N \ Pi(G)) unionmulti Pi(G), and let c1 = 0 and c2 = 1,
that is, the cost of the members of coalition N \ Pi(G) is 0, and the cost of
the members of coalition Pi(G) is 1 (see Definition 3). Then the generated
airport game v(G,c) = u¯Pi(G).
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On the other hand, it is clear that there is an airport game which is not
the dual of any unanimity game. 
It is important to see how the classes of airport games and upstream
responsibility games are related to the convex cone spanned by the duals of
the unanimity games.
Theorem 8. For any rooted tree G, GG ⊂ cone {u¯Pi(G)}i∈N . Therefore,
GA ⊂ GNUR ⊂ cone {u¯T}T∈2N\{∅}.
Proof. First we show that GG ⊂ cone {u¯Pi(G)}i∈N .
Let v ∈ GG be an upstream responsibility game. Since G = (V,E) is a
rooted tree, for each i ∈ N , #{j ∈ V : ij ∈ E} = 1, so we can name the
node before player i, let i− = {j ∈ V : ij ∈ E}. Then for any i ∈ N , let
αPi(G) = ci−i.
Finally, it is easy to see that v =
∑
i∈N αPi(G)u¯Pi(G).
Second we show that cone {u¯Pi(G)}i∈N \ GG 6= ∅. Let N = {1, 2}, then∑
T∈2N\{∅} u¯T /∈ GG, that is game (1, 1, 3) is not an upstream responsibility
game. 
The following example is an illustration of the above result.
Example 9. Consider the upstream responsibility game of Example 2. Then
P1(G) = {1}, P2(G) = {1, 2} and P3(G) = {1, 3}. Furthermore, αP1(G) = 2,
αP2(G) = 4 and αP3(G) = 1. Finally, v(G,c) = 2u¯{1} + 4u¯{1,2} + u¯{1,3} =∑
i∈N αPi(G)u¯Pi(G).
Next we discuss further corollaries of Lemmata 7 and 8. First we show
that even if for any rooted tree G, GG is a convex set, the classes of airport
games and upstream responsibility games are not convex.
Lemma 10. GNA is not a convex set, moreover GNUR is not convex either.
Proof. Let N = {1, 2}. From Lemma 7 {u¯T}T∈2N\{∅} ⊆ GNA , however,∑
T∈2N\{∅}
1
3
u¯T /∈ GNUR, that is, game (1/3, 1/3, 1) is not an upstream re-
sponsibility game. 
The following corollary has a key role in Young (1985)’s axiomatization
of the Shapley value on the classes of airport and upstream responsibility
games. It is well-known that the duals of the unanimity games are linearly
independent vectors. From Lemma 8, for any rooted tree G and v ∈ GG, v =∑
i∈N αPi(G)u¯Pi(G), where weights αPi(G) are well-defined, that is, those are
uniquely determined. The following lemma says that for any game v ∈ GG, if
we erase the weight of any basis vector (the duals of the unanimity games),
then we get a game belonging to GG.
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Proposition 11. For any rooted tree G and v =
∑
i∈N αPi(G)u¯Pi(G) ∈ GG, for
each i∗ ∈ N , ∑i∈N\{i∗} αPi(G)u¯Pi(G) ∈ GG. Therefore, for any airport game
v =
∑
T∈2N\{∅} αT u¯T and T
∗ ∈ 2N \ {∅}, ∑T∈2N\{∅,T ∗} αT u¯T ∈ GNA , and for
any upstream responsibility game v =
∑
T∈2N\{∅} αT u¯T and T
∗ ∈ 2N \ {∅},∑
T∈2N\{∅,T ∗} αT u¯T ∈ GNUR.
Proof. Let v =
∑
i∈N αPi(G)u¯Pi(G) and i
∗ ∈ N . Then let the cost function c′
be defined as follows, for any e ∈ E, (see the proof of Lemma 8)
c′e =
{
0, if e = i∗−i∗,
ce otherwise.
Then game
∑
i∈N\{i∗} αPi(G)u¯Pi(G) = v(G,c′), that is,
∑
i∈N\{i∗} αPi(G)u¯Pi(G) ∈
GG. 
The following example is an illustration of the above result.
Example 12. Consider the upstream responsibility game of Example 2, and
take player 2. Then
c′(e) =

2, if e = 01,
0, if e = 12,
1, if e = 13.
Moreover,
∑
i∈N\{i∗} αPi(G)u¯Pi(G) = 2u¯{1} + u¯{13} = v(G,c′) is an upstream
responsibility game.
Finally, an obvious observation:
Lemma 13. Every upstream responsibility game is concave.
Proof. The duals of the unanimity games are concave games, hence Lemma
8 implies the statement. 
To sum up our results we conclude as follows:
Corollary 14. The class of airport games is a union of finitely many convex
cones, but it is not convex, and it is a proper subset of the class of upstream
responsibility games. The class of upstream responsibility games is also a
union of finitely many convex cones, but is not convex either, and it is a
proper subset of the finite convex cone spanned by the duals of the unanim-
ity games, therefore every upstream responsibility game is concave, so every
airport game is concave too.
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3 Solutions for upstream responsibility games
In this section we propose solutions for upstream responsibility games.
A solution on set A ⊆ GN ψ is a set-valued mapping ψ : A  RN , that
is, a solution assign a set of allocations to each game. In the following, we
define two solutions.
Let v ∈ GN and
piSh(S) =

#S!(#(N \ S)− 1)!
#N !
, if i /∈ S,
0 otherwise.
Then φi(v) the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) of player i in game v is the p
i
Sh
expected value of v′i. In other words
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N
v′i(S) p
i
Sh(S) . (1)
Furthermore, let φ denote the Shapley value.
It is obvious from its definition that the Shapley solution is a single valued
solution, a single valued solution is called value.
Next, we introduce an other solution, the core (Shapley, 1955). Let
v ∈ GNUR be an upstream responsibility game. Then the core of upstream
responsibility game v is defined as follows
core (v) =
{
x ∈ RN :
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N), and for any S ⊆ N,
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ v(S)
}
.
The core consists of the stable allocations of the value of the grand coali-
tion, that is, any allocation of the core is such that the allocated cost is the
total cost (
∑
i∈N xi = v(N)) and no coalition has incentive to deviate from
the allocation scheme.
In the following definition we list the axioms we use to characterize the
Shapley value.
Definition 15. A value ψ on A ⊆ GN is / satisfies
• Pareto optimal (PO), if for all v ∈ A, ∑
i∈N
ψi(v) = v(N),
• null-player property (NP ), if for all v ∈ A, i ∈ N , v′i = 0 implies
ψi(v) = 0,
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• equal treatment property (ETP ), if for all v ∈ A, i, j ∈ N , i ∼v j
implies ψi(v) = ψj(v),
• additive (ADD), if for all v, w ∈ A such that v + w ∈ A, ψ(v + w)
= ψ(v) + ψ(w),
• marginal (M), if for all v, w ∈ A, i ∈ N , v′i = w′i implies ψi(v) = ψi(w).
Brief interpretations of the above introduced axioms are as follows: An-
other, commonly used name of axiom PO is Efficiency. This axiom requires
that the total cost must be shared among the players. Axiom NP is about
that, if a player’s marginal contribution is zero, that is, she has no influence,
effect on the given situation, then her share (her value) must be zero.
The axiom ETP puts the requirement that, if two players have the same
effects in the given situation, then their evaluations must be equal. Going
back to our example, if two firms are equivalent in regard to their emission
costs, then their cost shares must be equal.
A value meets axiom ADD, if for any two games, adding up the games
first then evaluate the players, or evaluate the players first then adding up
their evaluations does not matter. Axiom M requires that, if a given player
in two games produces the same marginal contributions, then the player’s
value must be the same in the two games.
First we take an obvious observation:
Proposition 16. Let A,B ⊆ GN . If a set of axioms characterizes a solution
on both classes of games A and B, and the solution meets the set of axioms
on A ∪B, then set of axioms characterizes the solution on class A ∪B.
In this section we consider two characterizations of the Shapley value on
the classes of airport games and upstream responsibility games. The first
one is Shapley’s original axiomatization (Shapley, 1953).
Theorem 17. For any rooted tree G, a value ψ on GG is PO, NP , ETP
and ADD if and only if ψ = φ, that is, if and only if it is the Shapley
value. Therefore, a value ψ on the class of airport games is PO, NP , ETP
and ADD if and only if ψ = φ, and a value ψ on the class of upstream
responsibility games is PO, NP , ETP and ADD if and only if ψ = φ.
Proof. if: It is well known that the Shapley value meets axioms PO, NP ,
ETP and ADD, see e.g. Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003).
only if: From Lemmata 6 and 7 ψ is defined on the cone spanned by
{u¯Pi(G)}i∈N .
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Take i∗ ∈ N . Then for any α ≥ 0 and players i, j ∈ Pi∗(G), i ∼αu¯Pi∗ (G) j,
and for any player i /∈ Pi∗(G), i ∈ NP (αu¯Pi∗ (G)).
Then the axiom NP implies that for any player i /∈ Pi∗(G), ψi(αu¯Pi∗ (G)) =
0. Moreover, from the axiomETP for any players i, j ∈ Pi∗(G), ψi(αu¯Pi∗ (G)) =
ψj(αu¯Pi∗ (G)). Finally, the axiom PO implies
∑
i∈N ψi(αu¯Pi∗ (G)) = α.
Therefore ψ(αu¯Pi∗ (G)) is well-defined (unique), therefore, since the Shap-
ley value meets the axioms PO, NP and ETP , ψ(αu¯Pi∗ (G)) = φ(αu¯Pi∗ (G)).
It is also well known that {uT}T∈2N\∅ is a basis of GN , and that so is
{u¯T}T∈2N\∅.
Let v ∈ GG be an upstream responsibility game. Then Lemma 8 implies
that
v =
∑
i∈N
αPi(G)u¯Pi(G) ,
where for any i ∈ N , αPi(G) ≥ 0.
From axiom ADD ψ(v) is well-defined (unique), therefore, since the
Shapley value meets the axiom ADD and for any i ∈ N , αPi(G) ≥ 0,
ψ(αPi(G)u¯Pi(G)) = φ(αPi(G)u¯Pi(G)), ψ(v) = φ(v).
Finally, we can apply Proposition 16. 
In the proof of Theorem 17 we have applied a modified version of Shapley’s
original proof. In his proof Shapley uses the unanimity games as the basis
of GN . In the proof above we consider the duals of the unanimity games as
a basis and use Proposition 16 and Lemmata 6, 7, 8. It is worth noticing
that (we discuss it in the next section) for the airport games Theorem 17 is
also proved by Dubey (1982), so in this sense our result is also an alternative
proof for Dubey (1982)’s result.
Next we consider Young’s axiomatization of the Shapley value (Young,
1985). This was the first axiomatization of the Shapley value not involving
the axiom ADD.
Theorem 18. For any rooted tree G, a single valued solution ψ on GG is
PO, ETP and M if and only if ψ = φ, that is, if and only if it is the Shapley
value. Therefore, a value ψ on the class of airport games is PO, ETP and
M if and only if ψ = φ, and a value ψ on the class of upstream responsibility
games is PO, ETP and M if and only if ψ = φ.
Proof. if: It is well known that the Shapley value meets the axioms PO,
ETP and M , see e.g. Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003).
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only if: The proof goes, as that Young’s proof does, by induction. For
any upstream responsibility game v ∈ GG, let B(v) = #{αPi(G) > 0 : v =∑
i∈N αPi(G)u¯Pi(G)}. It is clear that B(·) is well-defined.
If B(v) = 0, then the axioms PO and ETP imply that ψ(v) = φ(v).
Assume that for any game v ∈ GG such that B(v) ≤ n, ψ(v) = φ(v).
Furthermore, let v =
∑
i∈N αPi(G)u¯Pi(G) ∈ GG be such that B(v) = n+ 1.
Let i∗ ∈ N be a player such that there exists i ∈ N such that αPi(G) 6= 0
and i∗ /∈ Pi(G). Then Lemmata 8 and 11 imply that
∑
j∈N\{i} αPj(G)u¯Pj(G) ∈
GG, and  ∑
j∈N\{i}
αPj(G)u¯Pj(G)
′
i∗
= v′i∗ ,
therefore from the axiom M
ψi∗(v) = ψi∗
 ∑
j∈N\{i}
αPj(G)u¯Pj(G)
 ,
that is, ψi∗(v) is well-defined (uniquely determined).
Assume that i∗, j∗ ∈ N are such that for any i ∈ N such that αPi(G) 6= 0,
i∗, j∗ ∈ Pi(G). Then i∗ ∼v j∗, hence the axiom ETP implies that ψi∗(v) =
ψj∗(v).
By the axiom PO,
∑
i∈N ψi(v) = v(N). Therefore, ψ(v) is well-defined
(uniquely determined), therefore, since the Shapley solution meets the three
considered axioms (PO, ETP and M), ψ(v) = φ(v).
Finally, we can apply Proposition 16. 
In the above proof we applied the idea of Young’s proof, so we did not
need any of the alternative proofs for Young (1985)’s axiomatization of the
Shapley value by Moulin (1988) and Pinte´r (2015). We could do so because
Lemma 11 ensures that when we apply the induction step in the only if
branch we do not leave the considered classes of games. It is also worth
noticing that for the airport games Theorem 18 is also proved by Moulin and
Shenker (1992), so in this sense our result is also an alternative proof for
Moulin and Shenker (1992)’s result.
Furthermore, Lemma 13 and the well-known results of Shapley (1971)
and Ichiishi (1981) imply the following corollary:
Corollary 19. For any upstream responsibility game v, φ(v) ∈ Core (v),
that is, the Shapley value is in the core. Moreover, since every airport game
is an upstream responsibility game, for any airport game v, φ(v) ∈ Core (v).
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The above corollary shows that on the two considered classes of games
the Shapley value is stable, that is, it can be considered as a core selection.
Finally, as a direct corollary of our characterization of the class of up-
stream responsibility games, Theorem 8, we have the following result:
Corollary 20. The Shapley value on the class of the upstream responsibility
games can be calculated in polynomial time.
Proof. Take an arbitrary upstream responsibility game v ∈ GNUR. Then
v =
∑
i∈N
αPi(G)u¯Pi(G) .
Moreover,
φj(u¯Pi(G)) =
{ 1
#Pi(G)
, if j ∈ Pi(G),
0 otherwise.
Therefore, by αPi(G) = ci−i we have that for all j ∈ N :
φj(v) =
∑
j∈Pi(G)
ci−i
#Pi(G)
.

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